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Argument
This paper investigates whether there is a discrepancy between stated and actual aims in
biomechanical research, particularly with respect to hypothesis testing. We present an analysis
of one hundred papers recently published in The Journal of Experimental Biology and Journal of
Biomechanics, and examine the prevalence of papers which (a) have hypothesis testing as a stated
aim, (b) contain hypothesis testing claims that appear to be purely presentational (i.e. which
seem not to have influenced the actual study), and (c) have exploration as a stated aim. We found
that whereas no papers had exploration as a stated aim, 58 per cent of papers had hypothesis
testing as a stated aim. We had strong suspicions, at the bare minimum, that presentational
hypotheses were present in 31 per cent of the papers in this latter group.
1. Introduction
In this paper, we attempt to determine to what extent there is a discrepancy between
the stated aims and the actual aims of research in biomechanics (i.e. the application of
the theories and methods of mechanics to the study of living things). In particular, we
are interested in determining how often work is presented as testing a hypothesis (or
hypotheses), when the intent was not to test said hypothesis (or hypotheses).
We are interested in “hypothesis testing talk” because anecdotal evidence suggests
that research in the biological sciences is more likely to be funded, and even to be
published, if it involves – or, rather, appears to involve – hypothesis testing. For example,
a highly-regarded biomechanist wrote in an e-mail to Alexander that “BBSRC [The
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council] are focused on funding
hypothesis driven research. As most of my work has been funded by the BBSRC,
it is largely hypothesis driven.” (The individual in question was basing this claim
on his discussions with a named colleague who has served on the relevant BBSRC
committee.) However, we also believe that natural scientists sometimes go on what
might be called “fishing trips”: identifying and examining areas where looking carefully
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might disclose something interesting. We would therefore expect such “fishing trips” to
happen in several biological and biomedical contexts, whether or not they are presented
as such.
In fact, we have evidence that such “fishing trips” do occur in biomechanics from
a survey of eleven well-regarded biomechanists with a range of experience, which
we conducted before embarking on our analysis of published papers. We asked each
respondent to state the actual aims behind the work that led to their three best papers,
and were told that in five cases (15 per cent of the total) this was to explore a topic
rather than to test a hypothesis, collect specific data, or answer a specific question. One
respondent even suggested that:
[T]he balance is skewed by you asking for my best papers. If you asked for my last three
or ten papers then, especially with some work undertaken by research students, there
would be more of the “go and measure these parameters” . . . and then examining the
data looking for a pattern. A cynic might call that a fishing expedition. . .
Another explained how his exploration bore fruit:
Although [a colleague] and I started this investigation more to explore the topic and find
out more about it, I remember that suddenly, one day I realized that by combining [the
data with known muscle efficiencies] the experimental minimum of metabolic cost could
be predicted.
And finally, a third recounted the following tale:
[A senior colleague] invited me to attend [a particular conference]. I could not think of
anything I could say [about the topic] and [he] suggested I collect data on . . . The aim
of enabling me to attend the meeting was achieved! . . . My outlook had changed by the
time we came to write [the paper]. We now had a specific question to formulate and
answer. I could not have posed the question prior to collecting the data.1
It should be noted from the start that it is normally rather easy to present research
as testing a hypothesis (or hypotheses) even when it was not really designed for that
purpose. Imagine that a social scientist conducts a study on how salary varies with
respect to educational achievement in the UK, and that she relies on questionnaires
in order to collect the data. But now imagine she notices something that she did
1 In the interests of balance, we should add that a fourth respondent, who classified two of his best papers
as hypothesis testing, wrote: “I have surprised myself a little [in answering your questionnaire]! I have always
imagined that my science had a very large measure of floundering in the dark, but an analysis of three of my
favourite papers suggests otherwise. But perhaps it is because the work was so sharply focused from the start that
it yielded the more satisfactory publications.” Note, however, that what scientists consider to be their best work
may be influenced by the citation count. And the citation count may be affected by whether the paper claims
to test a hypothesis. These matters are worthy of empirical study, but are beyond the scope of the present paper.
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not expect, namely that quality of handwriting correlates inversely with educational
achievement. When she comes to presenting her research, she might easily suggest that
it was designed to test a hypothesis (or hypotheses) concerning handwriting; and this
might be a good strategy to improve probability of publication. (Indeed, she might
even suggest that she gathered qualitative data to increase the amount of handwriting
on each questionnaire.)2 Alas, however, her readers would be misled about how she
worked if they took her paper at face value.
Such concerns have been raised before, of course. Popper (1983, 47–48), for
instance, once bemoaned the inductive style that he saw as prevalent in biological
research:
Nowhere is the power of the inductivist tradition as conspicuous as in what I have called
‘the inductive style’ – a certain manner of reporting one’s researches which is still the
traditional way of writing in a number of biological journals, although by now it has
almost disappeared from the journals of physics and chemistry.
The basic idea which inspires the inductive style is this: we must keep carefully to
our actual observations, and must beware of theorizing; for this may make us acquire
theoretical prejudices which may easily bias or taint our observations if we are not very
careful. . .
[N]o doubt those trained to write in this way are unaware that this laudable and apparently
safe idea is the mistaken result of a prejudice – worse still, of a philosophical prejudice –
and of a mistaken theory of objectivity. . . [W]e cannot avoid or suppress our theories,
or prevent them from influencing our observations; yet we can try to recognize them as
hypotheses and formulate them explicitly, so that they may be criticized.3
As a concrete example, Popper gave Fleming’s (1929) classic paper in which the
discovery of penicillin is reported. He objected that Fleming’s presentation makes
it seem as if the discovery was entirely unexpected, although theories concerning
antibodies had been common currency for almost a century beforehand:
Fleming’s discovery was not really accidental: it was the work of a great discoverer who
knew very well what he was doing, and what was worth describing: and though it was
an accident that the mould whose antibiotic properties he had observed turned out to be
non-toxic, the existence of substances of this kind had been expected, and hoped for, for
2 Similar examples are easy to construct, and are not peculiar to social science. Here’s a medical one: a researcher
wishes to investigate how effective a drug is in treating a specific condition, but is told by the drug manufacturer,
subsequent to the completion of her study, that all the pills she was provided with were defective. In an attempt
to prevent all her hard work going to waste, she might present the study as testing a hypothesis about the placebo
effect.
3 It should be noted that although this discussion was first published in 1983, Popper completed it much earlier;
and by 1962 at the latest. See the editor’s (W. W. Bartley’s) foreword in Popper 1983.
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a long time. This expectation motivated the work both of Fleming and [subsequently] of
Florey’s team. (Popper 1983, 49)
Popper was writing around fifty years ago, however. (See footnote 3. Medawar
1963, which is better known, came slightly later!) So might the situation now be rather
different? Perhaps Popper’s views – (1) that scientists should state their assumptions
clearly and explicitly, so that they may be easily criticized; and (2) that genuine scientific
activity involves only conjecture and refutation – have even been responsible for some
changes. Is a (broadly) hypothetico-deductive style where research is made out to
involve more predictions and tests than it actually does, and which is just as misleading
as its inductive forerunner, the new usurper?4
Why is this investigation worthwhile? As we will later illustrate, we take its results to
have potential epistemic, and not just stylistic or sociological, significance. In particular,
many philosophers and scientists have thought that theories cannot be confirmed (or
even corroborated) by old data that they merely accommodate. The nub of the idea is
that it is one thing to generate a theory that is consistent with the data one happens
to have, or to “data fit”; it is quite another then to generate novel predictions using
that theory, and to put it to the test. According to Popper (1959), for instance, how
we arrive at our theories is a matter for psychological study only; what we do with
them, when we have them, is the important epistemic part. And if we were to be given
a false impression about what had been done with a theory, then we might also be
given a false impression about how we should regard it. An historical example might
help to illustrate the issue. Leverrier’s prediction of the existence of Neptune (see
Hanson 1962) was heralded as a great success for Newtonian mechanics. But would
it have been as great a success if Neptune had been spotted first, and Leverrier had
subsequently shown that Newtonian mechanics could accommodate, or was consistent
with, its existence? (It may help to think about how astrology managed to accommodate
Neptune’s existence with relative ease.) And how about if Neptune had been known
about for many years before Newton was born?5
Before we continue, we should also say something about why we suspect that
examining biomechanics is an interesting way of shedding light on this issue. The
answer is simple. Since biomechanists rely on physical theory to a large extent – indeed,
many have backgrounds in physics or engineering – we might expect their work to
4 We think that Popper was correct about (1), but that his position on (2) was too strong. See Rowbottom
(2011a), for example, on how both dogmatic and critical scientists may be necessary for the best possible science.
5 This is a considerably more complicated example than it may first seem; it may also matter, for example, at
what point Uranus’ orbit was known. One issue is whether the prediction must be temporally novel, or need
merely have been a prediction that was never made before – i.e. which was never previously derived from any
physical theory and appropriate background assumptions. If the latter view is correct, then one would do better
to consider two theories that predict some of the same things. So we might compare Newtonian mechanics
with relativity, and ask whether our old data concerning the accuracy of relativity when the gamma factor is
approximately zero serves to confirm/corroborate relativity.
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be similar to that of other physicists and engineers, i.e. not especially aimed at testing
specific hypotheses (whether or not it ought to be).6 We might therefore attribute a
presentational emphasis on hypothesis-testing in their work to their involvement in
biological science, and interaction with biological scientists. Ultimately, however, this
study is interesting in its own right in so far as it provides evidence of a peculiar form
of emphasis (or even misrepresentation) in biomechanical publications.
2. Method
For our investigation we selected two journals that we consider to be among the most
important for the subject of biomechanics: Journal of Biomechanics and The Journal of
Experimental Biology. Journal of Biomechanics publishes only biomechanical papers, most
of them on or relevant to human biomechanics. Typical authors work in engineering
or medical science laboratories. The Journal of Experimental Biology publishes papers
not only on biomechanics, but also over a much wider field. Most of its papers are
about non-human animals, but there are also some on human biomechanics. Typical
authors work in biology laboratories. For decisions as to which papers in The Journal of
Experimental Biology should be regarded as biomechanical in subject matter, we relied on
the judgment of Alexander, who has fifty years experience in biomechanical research
and has written several textbooks in the field.
We each classified the papers independently, using three categories for stated aims:
(1) Hypothesis Testing (H)
(2) Exploratory (E)
(3) Other (O)
With respect to the classification of H, we decided that the philosophical question
of what genuinely counts as a test, or an attempt to test, is beside the point. We are
interested in whether scientists attempt to present their work as testing a hypothesis (or
hypotheses), and therefore only in what they perceive to fit the bill. This mitigates in
favor of allowing both “hypothesis” and “testing” a broad scope. As such, we agreed
that professed attempts to “verify,” “validate,” or “confirm” all counted as professed
attempts to test. Furthermore, we agreed that “a hypothesis” might be a prediction, a
theory, or even a model (e.g. a computer model). Finally, uses of the verb “hypothesize”
were typically understood to imply that the paper sought, in part if not in whole, to
test something. Exceptions were only made when “hypothesize” was used to state a
working assumption, e.g. a theory that was taken for granted in the execution of the
research.
6 We do not provide support for this contention that the work of physicists and engineers is not generally aimed
at testing specific hypotheses, because another study of a similar nature to that presented here would be required.
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We also decided that we would classify a paper as H if there was any mention of
hypothesis testing (using the broad understanding explained above) as an aim, even as
subsidiary and among many. But we did not, however, give such a classification if the
paper claimed only that some collected data bore on a hypothesis (e.g. by “confirming,”
“supporting,” “corroborating,” or “disconfirming” it). Recognizing that there would
still be differences in classifications, we also agreed that we would discuss these in order
to resolve them, when they occurred, and leave open the option of introducing a “dis-
agreement” category for cases in which we were unable to reach a considered consensus.
Papers put into the H category would be subsequently examined, again
independently in the first instance, in order to see in how many instances we would
each classify the stated aim of hypothesis testing as merely presentational (P), rather than
actual. In short, we were looking for cases in which the stated aim (of H) did not match
the actual aim. We agreed that a P classification would be given if any one hypothesis
testing statement in the paper appeared to be presentational.
However, it soon transpired, when we compared and discussed our results, that there
were several cases in which we thought that it was appropriate to register a serious
suspicion (S) that a hypothesis was presentational, without giving a full P classification.
(The difference between the two classifications is in estimated evidence levels. We
classified a paper as P if we thought there was strong evidence of the presence of at
least one presentational hypothesis. We used an S classification if we thought there was
some evidence, but not strong evidence, of such a hypothesis. The difference could be
expressed numerically, by an appropriate function, e.g. a probability function, ranging
from zero to one. Roughly, a P classification corresponds to a value above 0.8. An S
classification corresponds to a value in the interval [0.5, 0.8].) We will discuss some
specific examples in the next section.
We would also like to emphasize that we erred on the side of caution in classifying
papers as involving presentational hypotheses (P), so as to avoid false positives (at the
risk of an increase in false negatives). If either of us had doubts about whether a
P classification was warranted after the discussion phase of our data analysis, in any
particular case, then we only registered a suspicion (S) at most. (Thus if one of us scored
a paper as P, and the other scored it as S, it would not have a final P classification.)
Furthermore, a suspicion must have been agreed as reasonable by us both, in order for
an S classification to be awarded. (Hence if one of us scored a paper as S, and the other
scored it as neither S nor P, then it would not have a final S classification.)
Clearly the judgments required were difficult, and we were error prone in making
them. We could not know the minds of the authors! However, we could isolate cases
where (1) it seemed abundantly clear before the research reported in the paper was
performed, often by the author’s own admission, that one of the stated hypotheses was
true (or false),7 and/or (2) the alleged intent to test a hypothesis appears to have been
7 Models cannot, of course, be true or false; in these cases, “good” or “bad” (or “fit for purpose” or “not fit for
purpose”) would be more appropriate. Similarly, one might read “accurate” or “inaccurate” for predictions.
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incidental, at best, to the research as a whole. We should also like to make it clear that
such cases may not involve any form of significant scientific misconduct. For example,
research findings can falsify a hypothesis even if they were not intended to do so; so
to misrepresent an experiment as an intentional test of T need not mislead anyone
about whether T was falsified. Rather, it would only make out that an accidental or
incidental finding was actively sought.
As we mentioned earlier, however, in some cases such misrepresentations might
mislead about to what extent a hypothesis has been confirmed/corroborated by an
experiment, at least on some accounts of scientific confirmation. For example, it
has often been held that the real test of a theory or hypothesis is whether it yields
a successful risky prediction (i.e. a prediction of something previously unexpected),
rather than merely accommodates known data. As Musgrave (1974) notes, versions
of this view have been held by many philosophers and scientists, such as Descartes,
Leibniz, Whewell, and Duhem. There are also others who do not appear on his list,
who at least thought that prediction is significantly different from accommodation in
epistemic import. For Boyle (cf. Stewart 1991, 119), for example, one quality of an
excellent hypothesis is:
That it enable a skilfull Naturalist to Foretell Future Phaenomena, by their Congruity or
Incongruity to it: and especially the Events of such Expts as are aptly devisd to Examine
it; as Things that ought or ought not to be Consequent to it.
As Musgrave (1974, 5) notes, “Popper occasionally suggests that it is a psychological
affair: for a test to be severe the experimenter who performs it must be sincerely
trying to overthrow the theory tested.” But even if it is not quite such a psychological
affair, the background knowledge at the time the experiment is performed (either of
the individual, or more plausibly in the field) is arguably crucial.8 This is suggested by
Popper’s (1959 and 1983) measure of corroboration, the workhorse of which is P(e, h &
b) − P(e, b), where e is a report of an experiment, h is a hypothesis, and b is background
knowledge at the time of the experiment. A classic example of excellent corroboration
(where P(e, h & b)  P(e, b)) was the discovery of the Poisson (or Arago) bright
spot, which was predicted on the basis of Fresnel’s wave theory of light but was not
expected to be found (especially by Poisson), as Rowbottom (2008a and 2011b, 45–48)
explains. Rightly or wrongly, and this is a matter we will say no more on here, a theory
of light which had merely accounted for what was already expected would not have
been so impressive. For further recent discussion on the relative value of prediction and
8 See Rowbottom (2011b, 94–95) on the question of whether sincerity matters. The main argument that it
does, in summary, is that sincerely searching may cause one to look in places that one otherwise might not.
(And true observation statements may nonetheless be selective.) This gels with the idea that we are prone to
confirmation bias unless we design appropriate experiments.
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accommodation, see Barnes 2005, Hudson 2007, Harker 2008, Rowbottom 2008b,
and Rowbottom 2011b.
3. Results
In total, we examined one hundred papers. We took fifty papers from volume 41
(issues 2 and 6) of Journal of Biomechanics (2008), and fifty papers on biomechanics
from volume 210 (issues 21–24) and volume 211 (issues 1 and 3–7) of The Journal of
Experimental Biology (2007 and 2008). As noted above, relevant papers from the latter
were selected by Alexander.
During our deliberations, we encountered two unanticipated problems in a small
number of cases. The first of these concerned how we should classify a paper which
stated that its aim was to “test whether” something is the case (rather than “test the
hypothesis” that it is, or is not, the case). Almbro and Kullberg (2008), for example,
state that they “tested whether the flight performance of an insect . . . is affected by
variation in body mass due to feeding.” This was a particularly interesting case, for us,
because we were both confident that the paper would be given a P classification were
it to be given an H classification (and one of us classified it as H and P in the first
instance, but the other classified it as O). This is because the authors already knew by
their own admission elsewhere in the paper (a) that the change in body mass of the
insects in question after feeding could be as great as 50 per cent, and (b) that previous
studies had shown that far smaller increases in mass in the relevant area of the body
resulted in decreased flight performance. (It is also pretty obvious by analogy, even to
a layman, that a 50 per cent increase in the mass of an aircraft after loading, roughly
concentrated in the belly area, would have an effect on its flight performance!) So it
appears that they really intended to quantify the (negative) change in flight performance
due to increased body mass after feeding, rather than to test the hypothesis that any
change (positive or negative) occurs. (And they were interested in the extent of the
change, we think, with respect to the “fitness” of the organism in question when it
comes to escaping predators.) So we both agreed that Almbro and Kullberg (2008)
did not intend to test what they say they tested, but not that they presented their
work as testing a hypothesis. Rowbottom thought that they were clearly making out
that that they were testing either the hypothesis that “flight performance . . . is affected
by variation in body mass due to feeding” or its negation. He also thought that it
was reasonably clear that they purported to be testing the former (by the context).
Alexander, on the other hand, maintained that there is a significant difference between
“testing whether p” and “testing the hypothesis that p.” Eventually we decided that
we should not classify that paper as H, in line with our charitable policy of favoring
false negatives (especially for S and P) over false positives. We mention this issue here,
however, because if Rowbottom is correct, then presentational hypotheses are more
prevalent than our results suggest.
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The second problem, which was related, occurred when authors said that they
wished to “determine whether,” rather than “test whether,” something is the case.
Rowbottom originally gave H verdicts for some of these papers, whereas Alexander
gave only O verdicts. After discussion, we agreed that O verdicts were preferable
because there was not even any explicit mention of testing. Again, this was in line with
our policy of favoring false negatives.
A summary of our overall results follows:
Table 1. Final Classification of 100 Papers from The Journal of Experimental Biology and
Journal of Biomechanics
H (Hypothesis
Testing) E (Exploratory)
S (Suspected
Presentational
Hypotheses)
P (Presentational
Hypotheses)
The Journal of
Experimental Biology
27 0 4 3
Journal of Biomechanics 31 0 8 3
Table 2. Percentages of H, S, & P Papers
H S P
The Journal of Experimental Biology 54% 8% 6%
Journal of Biomechanics 62% 16% 6%
Overall 58% 12% 6%
Table 3. Percentages of H Papers Classified as S, P, or S or P
S P S or P
The Journal of Experimental Biology 15% 11% 26%
Journal of Biomechanics 26% 10% 35%
Overall 21% 10% 31%
We will postpone our concluding discussion of the significance of these findings
until we have discussed some examples of papers classified as S and P.
4. Examples of Presentational and Suspected Presentational Hypotheses
The papers in which we found presentational hypotheses are as follows: Astley and
Jayne 2007; Clark and Summers 2007; Bates et al. 2008; Nowlan et al. 2008; Sigal
et al. 2008; and van der Merwe et al. 2008. We discuss three of these in greater depth
below.
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First, Astley and Jayne (2007) supposedly hypothesized that “snakes on cylindrical
branches would use a form of concertina locomotion” and “expected that the mean
velocity would decrease when moving up steep inclines” (which we take, in context,
to be a second hypothesis). We regard both hypotheses as presentational because it was
already well-known that snakes on branches use concertina locomotion and because
it would be astonishing if crawling were not slower on steep inclines. After explaining
that there are three types of concertina locomotion in a reference text intended for
advanced students, for example, Edwards (1985, 167) then states that one: “type of
surface concertina locomotion is used by all limbless tetrapods on flat substrates on
which projections are either too small or too sparse to act as good pivotal points. It is
also used by snakes in traversing thin structures, such as branches and even telephone
wires, where pegs are not available for lateral undulation.”
Second, Clark and Summers (2007) studied hagfishes, primitive chordates which
have tooth plates but no true jaws. They suspected that these tooth plates may be
inferior to jaws, and considered why this might be. They reported observations
on more than one species of hagfish and advanced the hypothesis that the
two closely related species are similar (in relevant respects). However, this is a
common assumption in biology, and we regard its formal expression here as
presentational. (We only know they are closely related species, arguably, because they are
similar!)
Third and finally, Bates et al. (2008) “hypothesized” that a part of the echolocation
call of a species of bat would be vulnerable to interference from conspecifics using
nearby frequencies, and that said bats would therefore have a “jamming avoidance
response” (or “JAR”). But the problem of interference between bats using similar
frequencies is well known, and it is inevitable that an echolocation system will be
jammed by nearby frequencies from another source. If we add that bats function in an
unimpaired fashion in large groups, it becomes obvious that they must have a JAR.
Bates et al. (2008) claim that: “Taken together, the existing observations of changes
in broadcast frequency by bats flying in groups or responding to playback in the field
do not provide conclusive evidence for a JAR in bats.” However, their standard for
“conclusive evidence” seems entirely unrealistic, especially since they admit elsewhere
in the piece that:
[V]ideos of swarming bats indicate that they have little problem orienting and capturing
prey in the presence of many other echolocating bats (Simmons et al. 2001). Animals that
emit their own orienting signals could adapt by changing the frequencies of their signals
in the presence of interference in order to avoid masking or “jamming”. . .
Some investigators have reported greater differences in emitted frequency between two
bats of the same species flying in close proximity than between two randomly selected
single bats of the same species. . . . Bats flying in groups have been observed to change
the duration of their pulses or their inter-pulse intervals . . . as well as the frequencies of
their broadcasts. (Bates et al. 2008)
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Furthermore, Griffin et al. (1963) had long ago, in a paper to which Bates et al. (2008)
refer, noted that: “Often echolocation is complicated by orientation sounds from other
bats nearby.”
We also strongly suspected the presence of (one or more) presentational hypotheses
in: Ellerby and Askew 2007; Estrella and Masero 2007; Hedrick et al. 2007; Anders et
al. 2008; Chang and Ulrich 2008; Ford et al. 2008; Jenkyn et al. 2008; Moazen et al.
2008; Parsons et al. 2008; Siegmund et al. 2008; Tan et al. 2008; and Verhulp et al.
2008. Below, we discuss four of these papers.
First, Anders et al. (2008) investigated muscle activity in the human trunk when
the body was tilted. They noted that trunk muscles have been classified as stabilizing
or mobilizing and hypothesized that that these two classes of muscles would employ
different strategies. Their results ran counter to the hypothesis. This would seem at
first sight to be a classic test of a hypothesis, but the predictions are so specific –
that the EMG-force relationship would have “a linear characteristic for local muscles
and non-linear curves for the global muscles” (Anders et al. 2008) – that Alexander
suspected that the hypothesis may only have been formulated after the results were
known, in which case it should be classed as presentational. Alexander was not aware
of any reason why one would expect such a difference.
Second, Estrella and Masero (2007) studied distal rhynchokinesis, a mechanism that
enables long-billed wading birds to open the tip of their bills independently of the other
parts. They “predicted that the protraction of the bill tip [the mechanism that drives
rhynchokinesis] during the strike and transport phases would be greater with larger
sized prey” (Estrella and Masero 2007). This seems so obvious, and so trivial in relation
to the main aim of the paper (which is to show that the birds use distal rhynchokinesis
to feed on items suspended in the water), that we have a strong suspicion that it was
presentational. The only doubt, expressed by Rowbottom, arises because it is possible
to open the bill in two ways (i.e. also along its length). However, there are clear and
reasonably obvious advantages to using distal rhynchokinesis; it does not, for instance,
allow so much water to enter the bill from the sides (which would reduce the efficiency
of suction feeding).
Third, Chang and Ulrich (2008) discussed a disease that severely impairs human
gait. They presented hypotheses about the effects on patients’ gaits of cords that restrict
lateral sway. Specifically, the authors ‘hypothesized’ that the cords reduce sway and its
variability, decrease co-activation of muscles, and reduce energy expenditure. These
hypotheses seem presentational, given that previous tests on healthy subjects had shown
that such cords reduced sway variability and metabolic costs. (Chang and Ulrich cite
Donelan et al. 2004 on this point, so were plainly aware of it.) The authors’ intent
does not seem to have been to test the hypotheses. Rather they appear to have wanted
to find out how and to what extent the patients’ gait was improved.
Fourth and finally, Siegmund et al. (2008) discussed the effects of cross-links
on the failure properties of mineralized collagen fibrils. They “hypothesise[d] that
predicted stress-strain curves under conditions with no collagen cross-links, with only
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0269889712000051
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Libraryy, on 05 Jan 2017 at 15:57:07, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
258 Darrell Rowbottom and Robert McNeill Alexander
enzymatic cross-links . . . or with additional non-enzymatic cross-linking . . . would
exhibit significantly different characteristics.” This is remarkably vague, but it is well-
known that cross links increase the strengths and elastic moduli of polymers. (An
analogy with bamboo scaffolding might even suffice for seeing this.) Their real aim
seems to have been to measure these changes, rather than to check whether they really
occur.
We can therefore see, in each of the seven previous examples, that there were two
main reasons for which papers were eventually classified as P or S. In a small number
of cases, the data did not appear to bear on one or more of the hypotheses that it was
the stated intention to test. In almost all of these cases we registered only a suspicion
(S), because we were concerned that the authors may have taken their work to have
relevance to all the stated hypotheses (although it did not in our opinion). In the other
cases, which were more common, one of the stated aims of the paper was to test a
hypothesis that was widely accepted to be true or false – so widely, indeed, that a
paper which stated simply that it would test the hypothesis would never have been
considered interesting enough to be published unless it ran counter to the expectation
– when it appears that the actual point of the exercise was to gather data in order to
understand some phenomenon (or phenomena) better. A sub-set of these cases were
hypotheses that we thought to be post hoc; typically, in such cases, we registered only a
suspicion.
Recall that we erred on the side of caution when it came to judging whether a stated
hypothesis was merely a working assumption. In their discussion of the echolocation
behavior of bats approaching prey or a landing site, for example, Melco´n et al. (2007)
stated the rather vague “working hypothesis” that “the difficulty of the echolocation
task is reflected in the approach behaviour.” The next two sentences are more explicit
and can be read as part of the hypothesis but merely postulate, more or less, that bats
will behave as observed in previous studies. If the “working hypothesis” was intended
as a formal hypothesis, it is presentational. However, we gave the authors the benefit
of the doubt and did not register the paper as H.
5. Discussion
Our most striking findings, over the one hundred papers, are as follows. First, no papers
had exploration as a stated aim.9 Second, 58 per cent of the papers had hypothesis testing
as a stated aim. Third, out of those papers which had hypothesis testing as a stated aim,
approximately one third (31 per cent) were strongly suspected, at least, of containing
some purely presentational hypotheses. We will discuss these findings in turn.
9 The only paper that came close to being classified as E, and then only by Alexander, was Marshall et al. 2008.
One of their stated aims was to “investigate feeding behaviour in bearded seals to determine the range of their
behavioural repertoire for capturing prey.”
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The first finding is perhaps the most remarkable, because it indicates a strong bias in
biomechanics against presenting work as the result of exploratory activity. That is, given
our evidence from survey work, mentioned in the introduction, that biomechanists will
privately admit that purely exploratory activity does lead to published work. Obviously
there are two primary means by which this might happen: on the one hand, authors
may intentionally avoid any reference to exploration as an aim of their studies; and on
the other, mentions of exploration may be filtered out by the refereeing process.
Recall that exploration appears to be directly opposed to hypothesis testing in the
following sense: to look somewhere in the hope of finding something interesting does
not require any hypotheses about what one will find, and does not involve the explicit
intent to test any hypotheses whatsoever (other, perhaps, than trivial non-scientific
hypotheses of the form “We will find something interesting if we look at x”). Thus
the evidence that biomechanists will avoid presenting their work as exploratory is
consistent with (and arguably corroborates, in conjunction with the other findings)
the view that hypothesis-testing work is up-valued. In short, to fail to present one’s
work as hypothesis-testing is not to rule out that it involved testing some hypothesis.
But to present one’s work as exploratory is to be explicit that the work was not aimed at
testing some hypothesis (or hypotheses). (Needless to say, it is possible that exploratory
work could be frowned upon independently of favoring hypothesis-testing work. But
admitting an exploratory strategy would not appear to be precluded by adopting the
inductive style written of by Popper and Medawar, for example.)
The second finding is also noteworthy, in so far as it is not terribly plausible that well
over half the work (worthy of reporting) that goes on in biomechanics is genuinely
aimed at testing hypotheses. This may be highlighted by our finding, in a pilot study,
that roughly 25 per cent of forty papers in the final sample had data collection as a stated
aim.10 This would leave only 17 per cent of papers that weren’t based on hypothesis
testing or collecting data; or, of course, exploration! Our suspicion is that hypotheses
are often “cooked up” in a highly proficient, and therefore quite undetectable, fashion.
As we’ve explained, this is not difficult to do.
And the fact that hypotheses are sometimes “cooked up” is illustrated by our final
finding. Even if we err strongly on the side of caution and imagine that only half of our
suspicions were justified – i.e. only half of the papers we classified as S actually contain
presentational hypotheses – then our results still show that there were presentational
hypotheses present in 12 per cent of the papers that we examined. (And recall that we
were careful to avoid S classifications if either of us had any doubts.) If these results
held on average, then one would expect to find a presentational hypothesis or two in
each issue of The Journal of Experimental Biology and Journal of Biomechanics.
Overall, therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that biomechanists have a bias towards
presenting their research as testing hypotheses, and (especially) prefer not to present
10 Clearly data collection can facilitate hypothesis testing, and be implicitly based on the desire to test hypotheses.
Thus stating that the aim of some work was to collect data does not involve denying that it was to test (or help
in the testing of) hypotheses.
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their research as if it bears no relation to hypothesis testing. Needless to say, this could
be mainly pragmatic, rather than reflect widespread agreement on what counts as good
scientific practice (or genuine scientific activity). If biomechanists suspect that their
chances of publication (and/or funding) will be increased by presenting their work in a
particular way, then many will do so even if doing so is inaccurate. The practice might
also have become entrenched somewhat through the apprentice-like system in which
biomechanists are trained.
Selection may also, or instead, have occurred in the refereeing process. It would be
interesting to discover how many of the papers we analyzed were revised in response
to comments from referees, and if the revisions ever led to the insertion of hypothesis
testing talk that was not originally present. It would also be interesting to discover how
many papers are rejected for failing to frame hypotheses for testing. Alas, this would
be a difficult empirical study to pull off; access to journal records, and particularly to
unpublished referees’ reports, would be required.
So are presentational hypotheses really a bad thing? Even if one rejects the view that
prediction has more epistemic significance than accommodation – instead holding that
how some data bears on a hypothesis is independent of when the data was collected (or
when the hypothesis was considered), and even how the data was collected (provided
the data is true/accurate) – it is difficult to see what advantage presentational hypotheses
offer. To reject such a view is to think that whether an author intended to test a
hypothesis (and designed an experiment for that express purpose), in gathering his/her
data, is scientifically irrelevant. Hence the “window dressing” would be unnecessary
unless it served to draw attention to the paper’s findings in a way that could not
otherwise be achieved. It is highly doubtful that it does, because one may state
that some data confirms or disconfirms (or corroborates or falsifies) some hypothesis
without saying anything about the intent behind the experiment to collect that data
(or behind any other activity by which the data became available). So to summarize,
we believe that presentational hypotheses are at best unnecessary, and at worst (often)
responsible for misleading readers about the significance of research findings (or specific
data).
We have still not explained precisely why hypothesis-testing seems to have become
“up-valued” in biomechanics. One reasonably plausible story, prima facie, is that this is
due, in part, to outside philosophical influence. For example, biomechanists (perhaps
as a subset of biologists) may have been looking for a way to make their work appear
manifestly scientific and adopted a hypothesis-testing mode of presentation on the
basis of the emphasis that this received from the likes of Popper (who is perhaps the
best known philosopher of science among scientists). Alternatively, and less plausibly,
perhaps many influential biomechanists became convinced that hypothesis-testing is
at the heart of genuine science (and refereed the papers and proposals of others
accordingly, influenced the views of their research students, and so forth). This is
a fascinating historical question which awaits a definitive answer, and which would
have to be the subject matter of a longer study.
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